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Introduction
Since the seminal work of, amongst others, Mankiw (1985) , Akerlof and Yellen (1985) or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987) who (re-)stressed the importance of frictions for at least the short term performance of the economy, the interest in models now termed New-Keynesian or New Neo-classical (NNS) has increased dramatically. The workhorse of modern macroeconomics is some form of a DSGE-model incorporating frictions of various kinds, especially sticky prices. Those models are used to address a wide variety of macroeconomic questions arising from discussions of monetary policy (e.g. Clarida, Galí and Gertler 1999) , fiscal policy (e.g. Woodford 1996) or open economy issues (e.g. Bowman and Doyle 2003) .
The models are usually tested empirically by comparing the theoretical impulse response functions with empirical impulse response functions obtained from a VAR-analysis (e.g. Rotemberg and Woodford 1998) . These empirical checks all utilize aggregate data for the output gap or the in.ation rate. Both are readily available from the simulationof the model and the empirical time series are easy to obtain.
In two recent papers (Higson et al. 2002 and Higson et al. 2004 ) the emphasis has been to use cross-sectional data to establish some stylised facts of the business cycle at a micro-level.
Using large data sets on US and UK firms, the distribution of the growth rate of firms' real sales was examined. The most striking finding was a significant counter-cyclical correlation between the cross-sectional skewness of the distribution and the aggregate economy. These stylised facts need some theoretical explanation 6 . In this paper we seek an explanation in a simple New
Keynesian model with Calvo-type sticky prices. Price decisions are time dependent but the times between price changes are probabilistic. The probability is set exogenously 7 . The purpose of this paper is to use the simplest form of the New Keynesian model with sticky prices to examine the relationship between the cross sectional moments of output and the aggregate economy and then to test the predictions on firm level data for Germany. It can also be thought 6 An alternative explanation that identifies heterogeneity in the financial state of the firm as important is explored in Holly and Santoro (2008) . 7 Recently Sheedy (2007) has proposed the idea that the probability that a firm changes its price is not set exogenously as in the Calvo model but depends on the time that has elapsed since the last price change. The longer the duration, the higher the probability of a change in prices. The hazard function describing price changes is upward sloping rather than flat as in the Calvo model.
of as an indirect way of testing if the assumptions of sticky prices 8 is in line with the empirical evidence 9 .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: in the next section a simplified version of a New Keynesian model with sticky prices drawing on Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) is presented and simulated. The pattern of the higher moments of the distribution of output growth and price changes is examined. The results are than compared to empirical results obtained from conducting an analysis in the vein of Higson et al. (2002 and 2004 ) using a German data set. This data set has the advantage of having ten times as many firms per year as the data sets used by Higson et al. And while Higson et al. only have quoted companies in their sample the German sample also includes non-quoted companies. The difficulty with the German data set at the level of the firm is that we do not have information on
prices. So we turn to sectoral data for the US.
The model
The model presented in this section is a simplified version of Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) . Both articles present a general equilibrium model incorporating price stickiness in a Calvo (1983) form. The simplification made in this paper is to neglect the government sector and money-in-utility function. Since we are interested in the intra cross sectional distribution of output and prices for the aggregate economy and not in specific economic policy questions, those simplifications should be straightforward.
The model consists of a continuum of identical, infinite living households. Each households produces a single differentiated good. Monopolistic competition, which is assumed to prevail follows the seminal work of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Spence (1976) so suppliers can set their prices. Each household maximises the lifetime utility over all periods t:
, u is a concave and v a convex utility function with u',v'>0. β is a discount factor and y t (j) denotes the household-produced good of the jth household.
represents the disutility of producing the good.
is the consumption index of the household j, which is given by:
In equation (2) 
where denotes the price of good z in period t.
  z p t
The minimization of the expenditures for a given level of the consumption index (2) leads to the Dixit-Stiglitz demand function for each good z:
Equation (4) shows how a given consumption level is allocated among the different goods in t. The optimal consumption basket for each period t is determined by maximizing the intertemporal utility function (1) subject to the intertemporal budget-constraint:
where is the nominal interest rate and is the wealth of the household at the start of period t. The left hand is the present value of the consumption expenditure while the right hand is the present value of selling the households' own product plus initial wealth.
t i
Solving this gives the standard Euler-equation (and pricing kernel):
Assuming a perfect capital market and identical utility functions for all households, equation (6) holds for the whole economy. In a frictionless world identical households would choose identical values for all variables etc. Due to sticky price adjustment the households differ in income over time. Households can insure themselves against these variations using capital markets, so even with rigidities the path of all variables is equal for all households.
Consequently the index j can be omitted form hereon. (4) to (6) represent the demand side of our economy. Turning to the supply side, sticky price adjustments have to be taken into account. In each period a household is able to change the price of its own product with probability 1-. After adjusting the price at the beginning of period t, the price will prevail in t+1 with probability in t+2 with probability  2 and so on. Each household j sets its price to maximise the present value of future revenues minus the loss of utility stemming from the work necessary to produce the good:
t  is household's marginal utility for a additional unit of nominal income in period t.
Since the receipts for good j play only an infinitesimal role in the budget constraint (5) marginal utility is assumed to be constant and omitted form the subsequent analysis (Woodford 1997 ).
The demand function for the good   j y t is given by (4) and depends on the price . The derivative with respect to yields the first-order condition for the optimal price :
holds. μ denotes a mark-up of prices over marginal costs representing the degree of monopoly power. Marginal costs are the cost of producing an additional good in t+k, given that the price has been chosen in period t:
The optimal price to be set in period t depends only on expectations regarding the future consumption demand and the future price level . Since households are identical they will form the same expectations and will choose the same optimal price if they are in a position to adjust. Thus the overall price index for all prices changed in t equals . From (3) it follows that the overall price index of the economy is a CES function given by
In other words, the current price level is a probability-weighted average of last period's prices and the price index of the adjusted prices in t.
It is assumed that the utility function   t C u is an iso-elastic function:
with 0   , the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Since we assume that the economy is closed without government and without private investment the only component of aggregated demand is consumption (Rotemberg and Woodford 1998, p 14) . Thus consumption may be replaced by total income Y. Log-linearizing (6) using (11) around the steady state leads to:
with denoting the inflation rate, values denoted with a hat representing percentage deviations from equilibrium and r is the equilibrium real interest rate.
Log-linarizing equations (9) to (11) yields:
and
. This is the New Keynesian Phillips curve: deviations of inflation from its equilibrium depend on the level of the output gap and expectations of future inflation.
Equation (13) can also be written as:
Equation (15) states that the deviation ( ) of the optimal relative price of firm j , from its equilibrium value depends on the probability weighted expectation of future output gaps (
) and the future deviation of inflation from its equilibrium (
The last remaining building block of the model is the determination of the interest rate.
An interest rate rule can also be derived from a microfounded approach 11 but since the main focus of our paper is not central bank behaviour we take a rule that has empirical support. In particular we assume a sort of a Taylor-rule with some degree of interest rate smoothing (see eg Clarida, Galí, Gertler 2000) :
With the specification of an interest rate the model is closed.
The model, the workhorse of modern monetary analysis (McCallum 2001) 12 can be summarised as:
10 This equation will be important for calculating the single firm behaviour later on.
11 See Corrado and Holly (2007) . 12 Of course there have been numerous extensions to the vanilla version of the NKM since the initial efforts. However, for our purposes it is unnecessary to introduce further complications when our main concern is to examine the cross sectional implications of heterogeneous price and output adjustment over the business cycle.
(17)
For the sake of simplicity, the equilibrium real interest rate is set to zero. If the target inflation rate is also set to zero, this implies an equilibrium nominal interest rate of zero. 
Model Solution
The common approach in the literature is to use the symmetric equilibrium features of the model to solve for deviations of the aggregate level of output and inflation from a steady state.
However, we are also interested in the cross sectional distribution of price and output adjustment. The problem then is how do we simulate a disaggregated version of the NK model?
One way would be to iterate over the population of m firms, aggregate using equation (4) and (10) and determine the expected aggregate price and output and re-iterate 13 . An alternative procedure is to take advantage of the fact that the Dixit-Stiglitz expression is also the perfect disaggregator (Grossman and Stiglitz 1976) .
We can write the companion form of the aggregate model as:
where ,
and:
We then use the algorithm from Stock and Watson (2002) 
After determining the relative price for each firm j, the demand function (5) can be used to calculate the output . By simulating (17) one obtains the output gap. After normalising the equilibrium output gap to 1 it is possible to calculate real sales for each firm   j y t 15 .
Calibration
To solve the model parameters have to be calibrated. A first crucial assumption is the value of the parameter  which represents the probability of a firm not changing its price in period t. If =0 all prices are perfectly flexible and each firm can respond immediately to changes in the environment. Since all firms are by assumption equal they will choose the same price and will end up with the same output level. The result would be perfect homogeneity. A similar argument can be made for the case =1. Here all firms cannot change their price. If the parameter lies between the two extremes and, for example a negative shock hits the economy, 14 Note that the addition of 1 in the upper part of the expression stems from the normalisation of the equilibrium relative price to 1. 15 Note that the addition of 1 in the upper part of the expression stems from the normalisation of the equilibrium relative price to 1.
the demand for all goods decreases. Individual firms will be affected by the shock in different ways according to their ability to change prices. Firms that can change their prices will lower them, leading to a smaller reduction in output compared with firms that have to stick to their initial prices. If a large fraction of firms cannot change its prices (i.e. if is large) a large fraction of the distribution of firms will end up with relatively lower output while only a small fraction will be able to increase their output relative to other firms. The skewness of the distribution would become positive and therefore counter-cyclical. By contrast if many firms are allowed to change prices the mass of the distribution will have relative small falls in output while a small fraction of firms who are not able to change prices will suffer heavier output falls.
The behaviour of prices will provide a mirror image to the response of output. Hence, the value of parameter  is crucial for the predictions of the model concerning the skewness of the cross-section distribution. In the simulations the sensitivity of the results to different values of  and therefore the degree of price stickiness will be examined.
Plausible settings for may be derived from studies of the average time period between two price changes, which is given by For the other parameters in the model, the literature also uses values within a certain range. To make our results robust we therefore use three scenarios: one is a baseline scenario with parameters taken from Woodford (1997) , a second follows Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and a third uses the settings of McCallum (2001) . An overview is given in table 1. Woodford (1996) , Rotemberg and Woodford (1998), McCallum (2001) and own calculations.
16 See, e.g., Cecchetti (1986) , Carlton (1986) , Blinder (1994) and Kashyap (1995) .
The base-line scenario has the advantage of using parameters for annual data which will be used in the empirical analysis in the fifth section. Unfortunately the values for  and  are not given in Woodford (1997) and have to be inferred by methods used in Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) in the case of  or plausible values have to be assumed as it is the case for .
The values for the Rotemberg and Woodford scenario are all estimated but only for quarterly data. They admit that the value for is too high to be plausible. We therefore simulate the results with a more plausible value given by McCallum (2001) . Here again the values for  and  are not given and have to be inferred. Since none of the parameter settings is entirely satisfactory we use all three to check for the robustness of the results.
Finally the parameters of the interest rate rule have to be specified. Parameters provided by Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1998) are used. 17 The parameters of the interest rate rule are set to = 0.25, = 1.3 and = 0.9.
Y bˆ b 4 Simulation results
With the calibrated parameters at hand, we simulate the model for 1000 firms and 1000 periods. We then report results based only on the middle 800 periods of the simulation to make sure that the results are independent of the starting values. scenario, is also too high. The Rotemberg and Woodford parameterisation leads to the best fit with the actual results. Given the simple structure of the model the weak fit for two of the scenarios should not be treated too seriously. Price stickiness in the model arises from both the Calvo pricing rule and from the presence of imperfectly competitive firms. Figure 2 shows how the correlation between the aggregate economy and skewness varies (for  fixed at 0.7) with the degree of imperfect competition (captured by ). As  rises and competition increases the relationship between skewness and the aggregate economy, as expected, disappears. The counterpart to the output decision is also the pricing decision. Figure 3 An otherwise standard New Keynesian model with Calvo pricing, where the only form of heterogeneity lies in whether or not a firm changes its prices, has the interesting property that there will be a relationship between the cross sectional moments of inflation and output and the aggregate economy and this relationship varies with the degree of price stickiness in a Calvo economy. This suggests that an indirect test of the degree of price stickiness can be derived from an analysis of the cross section of firms and the aggregate economy. To this we turn in the next section.
Skewness

The cross-sectional dynamics of the German business cycle: some empirical evidence
In this section we turn to an empirical examination using data for German companies 20 .
We use the Bundesbank's unbalanced corporate balance sheets statistics database (Unternehmesbilanzstatistik, UBS for short). This is the largest database of non-financial firms in Germany. The Bundesbank has collected the data when offering rediscounting and lending 19 Although we do not report the results there is also a significant relationship between inflation skewness and aggregate inflation. Ball and Mankiw (1995) find a similar positive relationship using a menu cost model. 20 Bryan and Cecchetti (1999) have drawn attention to a potentially serious problem associated with trying to establish a possible relationship between the mean and the skewness of a sampling distribution using panel data. However, given the size of the data set this bias is unlikely to significant. For an approach that uses a random cross section sample split see Gerlach and Kuglar (2007) .
operations on a strictly confidential basis. To enable the Bundesbank to carry out an extensive evaluation of their creditworthiness, the enterprises submitted their annual accounts to the branch offices of the German State Central Banks (Landeszentralbanken). They were then recorded electronically, audited, and evaluated for purposes of trade bill transactions. The
Bundesbank received around 60,000 annual accounts per annum. In addition, the Bundesbank performed checks for logical errors and missing data in the database as well as consistency checks and error corrections. According to Stoess (2001) , the unbalanced panel dataset comprises only about 4% of the total number of enterprises in Germany but about 60% of the total turnover of the corporate sector. Another key advantage of the database is that it comprises both incorporated and unincorporated firms. This has some appeal since the small and mediumsized firms in Germany ("Mittelständische Wirtschaft") show up in our sample 21 . Our micro database therefore gives a faithful representation of the German economy. In contrast to previous studies, we were able to use data from 1971 to 1998 for most of the analysis 22 . Even though the number of rediscount lending operations dropped sharply with the start of European
Monetary Union at the beginning of 1999, the Bundesbank tries to continue its comprehensive review of the credit standing of German enterprises involved in rediscount transactions.
However, eligible enterprises now submit their balance sheets to the European Central Bank.
This change of competence is the reason why 1998 is the last year of the period covered.
Although the theoretical and simulation part of the paper was concerned with both output and inflation, data on the price setting of individual firms is not available. Since we are mainly interested in the development of real sales 23 we have relatively few data losses owing to incomplete and inconsistent reporting. Real sales growth is calculated for each firm by deflating the firms' sales with the deflator of real GDP and afterwards taking the difference of the logarithm of real sales 24 . Following Higson et al. (2002 Higson et al. ( , 2004 , we take into account outliers by winsorizing the data, that is, by employing several cut-off rates, that is a fraction of, say a 50% growth rate, is truncated from the data. Some kind of cut-off seems to be necessary as some changes in real sales might be influenced, for example, by mergers. It is clear that a cut-off is a rather crude method to get rid of outliers and mergers. Unfortunately, no variable was included 21 More than 80% of the included enterprises are small and medium-sized enterprises (SME's) with an annual turnover less than 100 million DM, and more than half of the dataset consists of unincorporated firms. 22 We thank the Statistics Department of the Deutsche Bundesbank, in particular Tim Körting, for excellent research assistance. 23 The analysis is in terms of output rather than sales. Gabaix (2005) using the results of Hulten (1978) establishes an equivalence between (value added) output and firms sales. 24 One might argue that each sector should be deflated with its respective deflator. With only a few exceptions, e.g. computer manufacturing, the sectoral deflators all move closely together so that the GDP-deflator appears to be a good approximation.
in the dataset to indicate whether a merger had occurred or not 25 . This has the advantage of not being too restrictive while getting rid of most of the outliers and a lot of the mergers 26 . In the Appendix some summary statistics for the dataset using a +/-50% cut-off are presented. 25 The cut-off may also eliminate some newly founded firms as well as firms going bankrupt. Note that numerous other studies suffer from similar problems. 26 We also did several robustness checks using different cut-offs and checked the dropped observations for some form of regularity which was not the case. For a more thorough discussion see the working paper version of this paper Doepke et al. (2005) . 27 By contrast in the menu cost model of Ball and Mankiw (1994) both variance and skewness should be significant.
Mean
Evidence from US Sectoral Data
Although we find a significant relationship between the skewness of output and the aggregate economy with firm-level data we do not have price data for firms. In this section we use the NBER-CES Manufacturing Industry Database 28 . The database covers all 4-digit manufacturing industries from 1958 to 1996 ordered by 1987 SIC codes, with a total of 459 industies 29 . We take value-added and deflate by the price deflator for shipments. We then compute skewness in each year for the change in real value-added and the change in prices. We use two measures of the aggregate economy. We take the median growth rate of the 459 industries in each year. We also use the rate of growth of GDP 30 . The results are shown in the Appendix. For the median growth rate we find a significant positive effect of (lagged) growth on the skewness of inflation, as suggested by the earlier model. We also find a positive effect when we use GDP but it is only significant at the 10 per cent level. For the skewness of output the results are much less supportive and appear to contradict the findings for Germany (and also for firm-level data for the US, the UK and Italy. See Holly and Santoro (2008) for a summary of this empirical evidence).
Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a simplified version of Woodford (1997) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) using the DSGE framework to simulate the implications for the cross sectional distribution of firms implicitly embedded in the model because of the heterogeneity that arises from Calvo pricing. In each period not all firms are able to change their prices. This property generates a correlation between the skewness of the cross section of price changes and aggregate growth, and a correlation between the skewness of output changes and the aggregate growth of the economy. The sign of these correlation depends on the proportion of firms that are able to alter prices. For large values of , where 1- of firms change prices in any period, the correlation with skewness in positive for price changes and negative for output. Moreover, there is no correlation with the variance or the kurtosis of the cross section distribution. These theoretical results go some way to explain the "stylised facts" that have been previously identified by Higson et al. (2002 and 2004) for the US and the UK. 28 For a description of the data see Bartelsman, Becker and Gray (1996) 
